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Review for publication consideration.
Author’s Note: Thanks to the International Association of LGBT Judges
for their invaluable feedback. All errors are my own.
Footnotes
1. About Us, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/about-us
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
2. Gender, Sexuality, & Identity, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.
amnestyusa.org/issues/gender-sexuality-identity (last visited Dec.
11, 2017).  This particular mission statement relates to Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Human Rights and is one
of several “Human Rights Issues” for which Amnesty International
serves. Id.
3. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
4. Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Sentenced to 35 Years in WikiLeaks
Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-bradley-
manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-b87c-
476db8ac34cd_story.html. 
5. Aaron Blake & Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Comes Out as Trans-
gender: ‘I am a Female’, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013),
h t t p s : / / w w w. w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / w o r l d / n a t i o n a l -
security/bradley-manning-comes-out-as-transgendered-i-am-a-
f e m a l e / 2 0 1 3 / 0 8 / 2 2 / 0 a e 6 7 7 5 0 - 0 b 2 5 - 1 1 e 3 - 8 9 7 4 -
f97ab3b3c677_story.html(quoting an official statement made by
Chelsea Manning).
6. Paul Farhi, Media Wrestles with How to Refer to Manning, WASH.
POST (Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
style/media-wrestles-with-how-to-refer-to-manning/2013/
08/22/60dc0f0c-0b44-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html.
7. Id. (citing to the Christian Science Monitor’s use of the pronoun,
“he,” as well as the Washington Post’s “early articles,” which drew
serious criticism by members of Twitter).
8. Id. (citing to ABCNews and the Today show, both of which used
the pronoun, “she,” to refer to Manning).  Other news outlets,
such as CNN and later articles published by the Washington Post,
avoided the question altogether, couching discussions of Manning
in gender-neutral forms, including “Manning,” “former Army pri-
vate,” and “intelligence analyst.”  Id.
Amnesty International—a civil-rights organization that“work[s] to protect people wherever justice, freedom,[and] truth . . . [have been] denied”1—put it best in
its mission statement:  “We all have a sexual orientation and a
gender identity, and this shared fact means that discrimination
against members of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual[,] and Trans-
gender community, based on sexual orientation and/or gender
identity, is an issue that transcends that community and affects
all of us.”2 Fundamental to this communal conception are
notions of dignity and respect, both of which are to be enjoyed
by all people of all backgrounds. When transgender individu-
als litigate in court, the adversarial system sometimes ignores
these basic dignities and instead gives way to practices that
impede upon such individuals’ ability to freely express them-
selves in a manner consistent with their own identities. More-
over, under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and its vari-
ous state codifications, judges must rely upon traditional
notions of justice, judicial integrity, impartiality, and respect3
to ensure that transgender persons enjoy the same rights as do
other members of society.
This Note addresses this issue and responds with a set of
proposed solutions. Part I introduces a potential problem
faced by judges when addressing transgender individuals in
court proceedings after being presented a set of conflicting
pronouns—individuals’ preferred gender pronouns and those
that do not match these individuals’ true identities—and
includes a brief discussion of relevant case law. Part II applies
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to the general fact pattern
outlined in Part I and articulates relevant ethical canons,
rules, and comments that may give rise to disciplinary viola-
tions. Part III provides a set of solutions to this problem,
including better educating the courts in areas of LGBT cul-
tural competency and sensitivity, adopting local court rules or
standards with respect to LGBT issues, and promulgating
amendments to to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to bet-
ter address the ethical dilemmas surrounding transgender
individuals in court. 
IT STARTS WITH A PRONOUN—CASE LAW
On August 21, 2013 a military judge convicted former Army
Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning to 35 years in
prison for voluntarily disclosing classified documents to Wiki
Leaks.4 The next day, PFC Manning issued a public statement
in response to the court’s conviction on NBC’s Today show,
including a shocking announcement: “I am Chelsea Manning. I
am a female.”5 Manning’s announcement prompted nationwide
discord as to how to properly address the former military pri-
vate, now a transitioning transgender individual.6 While some
media outlets referred to Manning with masculine pronouns,7
others consistently referred to Manning in the feminine form.8
This debate ultimately prompted Manning to file a court
motion upon appeal of her conviction, asking the court to use
“[her] legal name, Chelsea Elizabeth Manning, [] to preclude
[her] former name, Bradley Edward Manning, and to use female
pronouns in reference to [Manning], in all future formal
papers” filed with and issued by the U.S. Army Court of Crim-
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9. Motion for Court Order to Use Appellant’s Legal Name and to Pre-
clude the Use of Appellant’s Former Name in All Court Docu-
ments, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY 20130739 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Name Change Recognition
Motion].  The Pentagon released a comprehensive set of pleadings,
motions, opinions, and orders pursuant to a series of Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests demanding full disclosure of
Manning’s first trial.  Adi Robertson, Pentagon Releases Trial Docu-
ments as Bradley Manning Prepares Formal Plea, THE VERGE (Feb.
27, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/27/4036448/
pentagon-releases-trial-documents-as-bradley-manning-prepares-
formal/in/3801093.  These documents can be found by searching
the Army’s FOIA library. Rec. Mgmt. & Declassification Agency,
RMDA Freedom of Information Act Library, U.S. ARMY,
https://www.foia.army.mil/ReadingRoom/Detail.aspx?freeText=ma
nning (last visited May 14, 2016).
10.See Name Change Recognition Motion, supra note 9.
11.Response to Appellant’s Motion for Court Order to Use Appellant’s
Legal Name and to Preclude the Use of Appellant’s Former Name
in All Court Documents, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY
20130739 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2015); Reply to Government
Response to Appellant’s Motion for Court Order to Use Appellant’s
Legal Name and to Preclude the Use of Appellant’s Former Name
in All Court Documents, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY
20130739 (Feb. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Manning Reply].
12.Manning Reply, supra note 11, at 2.
13. Id. at 2–3 (citing internal court filings).
14. Id. at 4 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2000); Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 106 F.3d 401, 410 n.1
(6th Cir. 1997); Merriweather v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 408 n.1
(7th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 n.2
(N.D. Iowa 1999); and Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600 (Me.
2014)).
15. Id. at 5 (referencing the World Professional Association for Trans-
gender Health, the American Medical Association, the Endocrine
Society, and the American Psychological Association).  Note that
the singular “their” is often used as a third-person singular pos-
sessive adjective to reflect the non-binary nature of gender and
sexuality; its use is also preferred by many gender non-conform-
ing individuals.  Avinash Chak, Beyond ‘He’ and ‘She’:  The Rise of
Non-Binary Pronouns, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34901704.
16.Manning Reply, supra note 11, at 5.
17.Order, United States v. Manning, No. ARMY 20130739 (Mar. 5,
2015) [hereinafter Preferred Gender Pronoun Order].  Note that,
unlike state or federal judges who are either elected or appointed
and subsequently confirmed by the legislative branch, the military
judiciary functions differently:
[T]he military judge . . . is appointed by the Judge
Advocate General [] of the appropriate armed service, serves
without a fixed term at the pleasure of the Judge Advocate
General, and is evaluated at least annually by senior officers.
Subsequent promotion and reassignment are dependent
upon the judge’s annual officer evaluation and the personal
knowledge and desires of those senior officers responsible
for assignments.
Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An Independent
Military Judiciary—A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, 3 WM. & MARY L. REV. 629, 630 (1994).   Military
judges are nevertheless still subject to their own judicial code of
conduct that mirrors that of the American Bar Association’s Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.  See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR
ARMY TRIAL & APPELLATE JUDGES (U.S. ARMY JUDICIARY 2008).  
18.Preferred Gender Pronoun Order, supra note 17, at 1–2.  Note that
the panel added a parenthetical qualifier to Manning’s original case
name: “nka Chelsea E. Manning.”  Id. In the legal context, the
acronym “nka” stands for “now known as.”  AM. SOC’Y NOTARIES,
IDENTIFYING THE SIGNER 1–2 (2005), at http://www.asnotary.org/
img/Identifying%20the%20Signer.pdf.
19.Miranda Leitsinger, Army Must Refer to Chelsea Manning as a
Woman, Not Man: Court, NBCNEWS (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/army-must-refer-chelsea-
manning-woman-not-man-court-n318286.
20.GLAAD Media Reference Guide—Transgender Issues, GLAAD,
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (last visited May 14,
2016); Farhi, supra note 6.
inal Appeals (ACCA).9 Notwithstanding public knowledge of
this gendered-pronoun controversy, the motion, itself, con-
tained no substantive justification for the request.10 Accord-
ingly, the government filed a motion in response asking for jus-
tification, and Manning responded.11 In her reply, Manning
argued that referring to her in the feminine form would not
cause confusion for the court and was required by the interests
of justice.12 First, Manning cited to her own psychological con-
dition, gender dysphoria, for which the government’s own med-
ical professional consistently referred to her “as female and
use[d] female pronouns when referring to [Manning].”13 Next,
Manning argued that the weight of authority supported the
grammatical use of her “[c]orrect [g]ender, which is [f]emale,”
since other courts traditionally deferred to transitioning indi-
viduals by using their preferred gender pronouns.14 Finally,
Manning argued that, based on medical consensus, “[f]ailure to
honor a person’s gender on legal documents [would be] tanta-
mount to erasing a core part of their identity and [would] be
damaging to treatment outcomes and mental health of persons
with gender dysphoria.”15 As such, Manning contended that
justice demanded a ruling in her
favor.16
A three-judge panel, writing
for the ACCA, agreed with Man-
ning.17 Without justification, the
panel demanded that “[r]efer-
ence to [Manning] in all future
formal papers filed before this
court and all future orders and
decisions issued by this court
shall either be neutral, e.g., Pri-
vate First Class Manning or
appellant, or employ the femi-
nine pronoun.”18 Some commentators contend that this was
the first time a court expressly ruled on a transgender-pronoun
issue,19 and many transgender-rights organizations applauded
the ACCA for its acceptance of Manning’s pronoun preference:
this practice is in accordance with the Gay and Lesbian Asso-
ciation Against Defamation (GLAAD)20 and is further
endorsed by Lambda Legal—a legal advocacy group “whose
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mission is to achieve full recogni-
tion of the civil rights of lesbians,
gay men, bisexuals, [and] trans-
gender people . . . .”21
Despite the ACCA’s deferential
respect for Manning’s pronoun
preference, especially given her
formal name change, other courts
have not been so willing to
endorse a transgender party’s pre-
ferred gender pronouns in court
proceedings. While certainly not
the norm,22 some courts refuse to
defer to a transgender individual on that individual’s preferred
mode of expression. For example, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin recognized that a transgen-
der plaintiff filed an action under her chosen name, but, since
she “remain[ed] a biological male,” utilized male pronouns for
ease of discussion.23 Additionally, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, although “recogniz[ing] that it is
painful for [the plaintiff] to be referred to as ‘he’ and that
courts have, at times, referred to male transsexuals as ‘she,’”
nevertheless referred to the plaintiff in the masculine form for
the sake of administrative clarity.24 More unpalatably, one
immigration-law judge has been reported to have said, in the
context of an appeal of a denial of a claim for asylum, that
“referring to a transgender woman by her preferred gender
pronouns was like actor Paul Reubens requesting to use his
stage name Pee-wee Herman . . . .”25 By failing to respect a
transgender individual’s gender-pronoun preference, these
judges seem to perpetuate transphobia in modern culture, and,
in wake of an individual’s express request to use their preferred
gender pronouns, may also violate the American Bar Associa-
tion’s (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct, especially in the
context of local, state, and federal anti-discrimination laws.
APPLICATION OF THE ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
In 1924, the ABA promulgated its first formal Canon of Judi-
cial Ethics (“Canons”), couched in lofty, aspirational goals for
the judiciary.26 In 1972, the ABA adopted a more practical
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (MCJC), which replaced the
Canons with better-articulated “Rules” of judicial conduct
under broader canons of aspirational ethics.27 The MCJC went
through a series of amendments in the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s, and it now contains a comprehensive set of provisions
21.About Us, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017); Know Your Rights in Court, LAMBDA
LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/in-court/faq
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
22. In a comprehensive search for court orders specifically discussing
gender-pronoun preferences of transgender individuals, most
courts do, in fact, defer to an individual’s preferred gender pro-
nouns.  See Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 959 n.1 (10th Cir.
2001) (“Although a biological male, [plaintiff] considers herself to
be a female and uses the feminine pronoun in referring to herself.
In deference to her wishes, this opinion will do the same.”); Levy
v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. TDC-14-3678, 2016 WL
865364, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2016) (“Because [plaintiff] iden-
tifies as female, the [c]ourt will use the feminine pronoun to refer
to her.”); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 n.1 (D.
Mass. 2012) (“Although [p]laintiff is biologically male, the court
will refer to her using feminine pronouns in deference to her
expressed gender identity.”); Inscoe v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-001588
DLB PC, 2009 WL 3617810, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009)
(“Plaintiff uses the feminine pronoun for self-identification, which
the [c]ourt will use here.”); Houston v. Trella, No. 04-1393 (JLL),
2006 WL 2772748, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2006) (“Because
[p]laintiff is a transsexual and identifies herself as feminine, the
[c]ourt will use the feminine pronoun when referencing [p]lain-
tiff.”); Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 n.4
(Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (“This [c]ourt will use female pro-
nouns when referring to plaintiff: a practice which is consistent
with the plaintiff’s gender identity and which is common among
health and other professionals who work with transgender
clients.”).   For courts that do not pay such deference, or for courts
that have not yet confronted the issue, this Note serves to educate
and notify judges of potential risks should they refuse to follow
this majority approach.
23.Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 n.1 (E.D. Wisc. 2010).
24.Kosilek v. Mahoney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 n.1 (D. Mass. 2002);
see also Gammett v. Idaho State Bd. Dep’t of Corr., No. CV05-257-
S-MHW, 2007 WL2186896, at *1 n.1 (D. Idaho July 27, 2007)
(“Plaintiff was granted a legal name change after filing this law-
suit.  Plaintiff is now known as Jenniffer Ann Spencer. Plaintiff’s
counsel used the feminine pronoun throughout court documents,
and [d]efendant’s counsel used the male pronoun.  The [c]ourt
. . . has elected to use the male pronoun for ease of discussion.”).
25. Jorge Rivas, Court Blasts Judge Who Compared Transgender Immi-
grant to Pee-wee Herman, FUSION (Sept. 4, 2015, 1:49 PM),
http://fusion.net/story/193788/circuit-court-blasts-immigration-
judge-transgender. Luckily, the Ninth Circuit overruled a series of
this immigration-law judge’s rulings that blankly rejected transgen-
der persons’ asylum claims.  See Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch,
800 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he BIA erred, however, in
denying her application for [asylum] relief, ironically exhibiting
some of the same misconceptions about the transgender commu-
nity that Avendano-Hernandez faced in her home country.”).  This
Note recognizes that immigration-law judges may not fall under
the purview of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  For the pur-
poses of this Note, assume that the judge’s discriminatory state-
ment could have been uttered by any judge (elected or appointed,
state or federal, etc.) for which the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
could apply.  For a comparison of immigration-law judges to judges
in state and federal court, see Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and
Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 428–430 (2011)
(arguing that immigration-law judges, because they are appointed
by the U.S. Department of Justice, lack true independence and a
conscious motive to maintain impartiality).  
26.Nancy L. Sholes, Judicial Ethics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 379, 381–85 (1992).
27.LaDonna Childress, To Fulfill a Promise: Using Canons 3B(5) and
3B(6) of the Judicial Code of Conduct to Combat Sexual Orientation
Bias Against Gay and Lesbian Criminal Defendants, 34 SW. U. L. REV.
607, 614 (2005) (citing Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform
from Small Rules?  Anti-Bias Canons as a Substitute for Heightened
Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363, 375–76 (2000)).
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“to provide guidance and assist judges in maintaining the high-
est standards of judicial and personal conduct . . . .”28 Should
a judge refuse to accept a transgender individual’s gender-pro-
noun preference, that judge may be in violation of the MCJC.
This part discusses and applies relevant MCJC Canons to the
typical “preferred gender pronoun” situation described above.
A. MCJC Canons 1 & 2: Integrity, Impartiality, and the Man-
ifestation of Bias
In its broadest sense, the MCJC requires a judge to “uphold
and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary . . . .”29 Implicit in the definition of “integrity” is the
concept of respect—for the law, the parties, the lawyers, the
juries, and, most broadly, the public. How can a judge be viewed
as exhibiting respect when that same judge ignores an individ-
ual’s chosen identity by refusing to adopt an individual’s pre-
ferred gender pronouns, either in the courtroom or in a judicial
opinion? By failing to defer to an individual’s preferred mode of
reference, this lack of respect directly aggravates a chief medical
concern of the World Professional Association for Transgender
Health—“to reduce the distress of gender dysphoria.”30 Gender
dysphoria is an “internationally recognized treatment protocol”
that focuses on “affirming people in their true sex—their gender
identity—socially, medically, and legally” and is not subject to
voluntary control.31 Accordingly, the refusal to affirm an indi-
vidual’s chosen identity carries with it the risk of serious psy-
chological trauma by failing to validate transgender individuals
and their identities on a humanistic level.32 Moreover, MCJC
Rule 2.8 requires an air of courtesy from judges when dealing
with those in court: “A judge shall be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, [and] lawyers. . . .”33
Thus, the express requirement of courtesy further (and more
explicitly) mandates a judge’s respect for litigants, which
includes respect for an individual’s gender identity and preferred
mode of self-expression. Judges should be cognizant of this risk
when addressing transgender individuals in court.
The ignorance of a transgender individual’s proper, med-
ically endorsed treatment further contributes to the very real
problem of microaggressions, or
“subtle forms of [intentional or
unintentional] discrimination
that occur daily and can manifest
as behavioral, verbal, or environ-
mental slights.”34 A common
example in the LGBT context,
cited in Galupo’s study, is the
“use of incorrectly gendered ter-
minology,”35 including the disre-
gard of a transgender person’s
preferred gender pronouns.36
These aggressions often compound with one another and work
to “erode a[n individual’s] feeling of value.”37 Judges should
recognize this risk of psychological harm and interference with
legitimate methods of treatment and strive to avoid the mani-
festation of bias, whether conscious or not, by refusing to defer
to an individual’s own preferred gender pronouns. Accordingly,
to combat implicit biases, judges must first recognize that such
biases exist.38 Thereafter, they must “[r]outinely check
thought processes and decisions for possible bias” and “pos-
sess[] a certain degree of self-awareness” to prevent its mani-
festation through their conduct in court.39
In fact, the MCJC contains express provisions against this
manifestation of bias in judicial proceedings, also expressly
outlined in the definition of “impartiality.”40 The ABA defines
the term “impartiality” broadly to mean the “absence of bias or
prejudice,”41 and MCJC Rule 2.3 contains the following pro-
hibitive provision: 
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial
duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
or engage in harassment, including but not limited to
bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex,
gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status,
or political affiliation, and shall not permit court staff,
court officials, or others subject to the judge’s direction
and control to do so.42
28.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
29. Id. Canon 1.
30.WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE
FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NON-
CONFORMING PEOPLE 167 (Coleman et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012),
http://www.wpath.org/uploaded_files/140/files/IJT%20SOC,%20V
7.pdf.
31.M. Dru Levasseur, Esq., Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the
Law to Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights,
39 VT. L. REV. 943, 956 (2015) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
32. Id. at 963.
33.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)
(emphasis added).
34.M. Paz Galupo et al., Transgender Microaggressions in the Context of
Friendship: Patterns of Experience Across Friends’ Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity, 1 PSYCHOL. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER
DIVERSITY 461, 461 (2014).
35. Id. at 465 tbl.3.
36. Id.
37.Astead W. Herndon, Harvard Allows Students to Pick New Gender
Pronouns, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.boston
globe.com/metro/2015/09/02/harvard-allows-students-pick-new-
gender-pronouns/C0EXpZHw09zwCzo4hVhjdJ/story.html (quot-
ing Genny Beemyn, director of the Stonewall Center—“a resource
center for LGBTQ and allied communities at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst”).
38.NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLU-
ENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS 5 (2012),  http://www.ncsc.org/~/
media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB
_Strategies_033012.ashx.
39. Id. at 10.
40.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see
id. TERMINOLOGY (defining “impartiality”).
41. Id. TERMINOLOGY.
42. Id. R. 2.3(B).  Section (C) of Rule 2.3 also requires judges to
ensure that lawyers presenting in front of the tribunal “refrain
from manifesting bias or prejudice” on the basis of sex, gender, or
sexual orientation.  Id. R. 2.3(C).  This proscription carries with it
the additional responsibility on judges to ensure that lawyers,
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through their written or verbal conduct, do not contribute to the
deleterious effects of bias arising out of lawyers’ refusal to defer to
a transgender individual’s preferred gender pronouns.  See id.
Accordingly, judges have the affirmative responsibility to prevent
the risk of discriminatory bias from all persons in the courtroom
from the very outset of litigation.
43.Bruce A. Green, Legal Discourse and Racial Injustice: The Urge to
Call “Bias,” 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 180 (2015) (referencing
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006)); id. at
183–85. 
44.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)
(“[T]he judiciary plays a central role in the preserving the princi-
ples of justice.”).
45.Note, too, that Rule 2.3 does not include a “knowledge” require-
ment.  Id. R. 2.3.  Thus, judges should not be willfully ignorant of
bias—implicit or explicit—and should take proactive steps to mit-
igate any such bias before it manifests in court.
46.See id.
47.Martha Minnow, Upstanders, Whistle-Blowers, and Rescuers, 2014
KONINGSBERGER LECTURE 1, 31 (2014).  Upstanders, as opposed to
bystanders, are those who do not idly wait to see social change and
progress; instead, they are those who “speak out and act against
what is wrong.”  Id. at 1.
48.See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
49.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2A (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990).
Although the word “respect” was deleted in later versions of the
MCJC, the drafters made clear that the term is implicit within
MCJC Canon 2.  In fact, the remnants of the “respect” language
are found in Rule 2.2, wherein “[a] judge shall uphold and apply
the law.”  ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 8 (2007) (“The reference to a judge’s duty
to ‘respect’ the law was deleted because it was . . . unneces-
sary.”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011).  Even so, the original language is still maintained in
numerous state and federal codifications of the MCJC, so respect
for the law, in its broadest sense, is most applicable to the practi-
cal judicial profession.  See, e.g., GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
1.1 (2016) (“Judges shall respect and comply with the law.”); N.C.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (2006) (amended 2015) (“A
judge should respect and comply with the law . . . .”); U.S.
COURTS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.15 cmt. (2014) (“Respect
for Law. A Judge should respect and comply with the law.
. . .”); 22 NYCCR 100.2(A) (2006) (“A judge shall respect and
comply with the law . . . .”).
50.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2.  The MCJC defines
“impropriety” as “conduct that violates the law, court rules, or
provisions of th[e MCJC], and conduct that undermines a judge’s
independence, integrity, or impartiality.”  Id. Terminology.
51.N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE
ON THE DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRES-
SION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2016); N.Y.C. Admin. Code §8-102(23), at
3 (Dec. 21, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y.C. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUID-
ANCE], http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/downloads/pdf/publications/
GenderID_InterpretiveGuide_2015.pdf.
In this regard, manifestations
of bias are grounds for discipline.
Arguably, these include subtle
microaggressions such as the
refusal to defer to a party’s pre-
ferred gender pronouns as a form
of self-affirming identification.
Yet, prominent legal ethics com-
mentator Bruce A. Green argues
that the “bias” the MCJC seeks to
curtail is not the sort-of implicit
bias—that is, “unconscious, non-
deliberate attitudes . . . that
affect individuals’ decisions”—at
issue, here.43 This Note argues a
different interpretation: the
MCJC requires a broader showing
of respect, not just impartiality, by requiring judges to be self-
aware of the effects of their conduct. This heightened self-
awareness, coupled with the court’s responsibility to promote
justice,44 supports the contention that microaggressions and
implicit biases should be actively avoided, even when not
apparent on the face of a judge’s conduct.45 Even so, a judge’s
refusal to defer to a transgender individual’s preferred gender
pronouns might not be a reflection of implicit bias at all;
absent explanation, it could draw an inference of overt dis-
crimination, or, if a judge does provide an explanation, such
rationale could be a mere guise—i.e., a mere pretext—for a dis-
criminatory animus against identifying individuals. These
“active” forms of discrimination are most certainly grounds for
discipline under the MCJC.46
Finally, as Martha Minnow argues, each person—especially
those in the legal profession— maintains a special responsibility
to create “cultures, institutions, and resources to help individuals
empathize with those who are oppressed.”47 LGBT individuals,
including transgender persons, are part of a traditionally margin-
alized group, and judges are in a unique position of power in our
legal system, charged with promoting and ensuring justice.48
Accordingly, it is a judge’s affirmative role to create this culture of
upstanding citizenship in the interests of justice, which includes
empathy for minority communities. It is arguably unjust for a
judge, in the course of a judicial proceeding, to disregard a trans-
gender individual’s preferred choice of pronoun, especially when
such disregard knowingly (and deleteriously) interferes with
treatment techniques for gender dysphoria normally left to the
sound discretion of medical professionals. Doing so only
strengthens the stigma associated with transgender persons and
undercuts their positive inclusion in modern society.
B. “Respect for the Law”
In earlier versions, the MCJC specifically held that a judge
must “respect and comply with the law.”49 Thus, to duly respect
the law, judges should be mindful of the current legal landscape
regarding transgender issues. The broadly couched term
requires a cognizance of the law and posits an affirmative duty
to avoid violating the law to “avoid the appearance of impropri-
ety.”50 For example, the New York City Commission on Human
Rights (“Commission”) promulgated legal guidance in response
to its Human Rights Law, which protects against discrimination
on the basis of gender identity, gender expression, and transgen-
der status.51 Under this local legislative scheme, transgender
individuals are protected from discrimination in the areas of
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52.N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102, 107(23) (West 2016); see also Kelsey
Harkness, In New York, You Could Be Fined $250K for Failing to Use
a Transgender Person’s ‘Preferred’ Pronoun, DAILY SIGNAL (Jan. 6,
2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/01/06/in-new-york-you-could-
be-fined-250k-for-failing-to-use-a-transgender-persons-preferred-
pronoun/.  The New York City Administrative Code also provides
for injunctive relief.  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-402 (West 2016).
53.N.Y.C. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 51, at 54.
Specifically, the Commission provides the following examples of
conduct that give rise to municipal violations:
1. Intentional or repeated refusal to use an individ-
ual’s preferred name, pronoun[,] or title.  For
example, repeated calling a transgender woman
“him” or “Mr.” after she has made clear which
pronouns and title she uses.
2. Refusal to use an individual’s preferred name, pro-
noun, or title because they do not conform to gen-
der stereotypes.  For example, calling a woman
“Mr.” because her appearance is aligned with tra-
ditional gender-based stereotypes of masculinity.
Id.; Harkness, supra note 52.
54.The New York City Administrative Code defines a “place of pub-
lic accommodation” as “providers, whether licensed or unli-
censed, or goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantages,
or privileges of any kind, and places, whether licensed or unli-
censed, where goods, services, facilities, services, accommoda-
tions, advantages, or privileges or any kind are extended, offered,
sold, or otherwise made available.”  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 807(9)
(West 2016).  In holding out services to all members of the pub-
lic, as courts are required to do, courthouses and courtrooms
arguably constitute “places of public accommodation” under the
law.  In other contexts of discrimination legislation, courts have
generally held that courthouses are subject to such statutes.  See,
e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that courthouses are “public accommodations” subject to
the American with Disabilities Act); Livingston v. Guice, No. 94-
1915, 1995 WL 610355 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995) (same).
55.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
Notwithstanding an underlying violation of substantive law, the
“appearance of impropriety” also reaches conduct in reasonable
violation of the MCJC, not just state or federal law. Id. Thus, con-
duct that gives rise to prejudicial bias or the inference of discrim-
ination should be avoided, as MCJC Rule 2.3 expressly prohibits
discriminatory conduct. Id.r. 2.3(A)–(B).  Moreover, judges who
fail to act courteously or who lack integrity are also arguably sub-
ject to disciplinary action.  See supra Part II.A.; MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8 AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
56.For a comprehensive discussion of judicial immunity, see SHRIVER
CENTER, FED. PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS § 8.2.A.1
(2013),  http://federalpracticemanual.org/book/export/html/46.
57.Stump v. Sparkman, 435. U.S. 349, 356–57, 59 (1978).
58.Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984) (holding that judi-
cial immunity does not bar a claim for prospective injunctive relief
in a § 1983 civil-rights action).
59.Livingston, 68 F.3d 460 (holding in an Americans with Disabilities
Act action that, in light of Pulliam, the litigant was not foreclosed
from bringing a claim for injunctive relief against a state court
judge).
60.On its “Know Your Rights in Court” webpage, Lambda Legal pro-
vides a sample filing to the court, similar to a motion presented in
Manning. Know Your Rights in Court, supra note 21.  The sample
motion expressly states that: (1) county courts are places of pub-
lic accommodation; and (2) county legislation expressly prohibits
discrimination on the basis of gender identity in any place of pub-
lic accommodation, including any county “facility, service[,] or
program.”  LAMBDA LEGAL, SAMPLE MOTION 1–2 (July 30, 2008),
http: / /www.lambdalegal .org/sites/default / f i les/sample_
motion.pdf.
61.A similar argument citing judicial immunity was brought to the
Maryland Office of the Attorney General (OAG) by a member of
the Maryland House of Delegates.  Letter from Md. Assistant Att’y
Gen. Kathryn M. Rowe to Md. Delegate Virginia P. Clagett (Mar. 5,
2004), https://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/Advice2004/Clagett
Mar12.pdf.  
employment, public accommodation, and housing, and those
found in violation are potentially liable for up to $250,000 in
civil fines for conduct that is willful, wanton, or malicious.52 In
its guidance, the Commission provides articulated examples of
violations of the law, including “failing to use an individual’s pre-
ferred name or pronoun,” since “all people . . . have the right
to use their preferred name.”53 Courts in New York City—as
places of public accommodation54—must be aware of this guid-
ance and must take precaution to avoid potential violations.
Again, failing to do so expressly violates the MCJC, since avoid-
ing the “appearance of impropriety” carries with it the duty to
avoid violating the law.55
Certainly, the obvious response is that judges, themselves,
are granted absolute judicial immunity and cannot be held
liable for damages under comparable local statutes.56 In the
landmark decision of Stump v. Sparkman, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that judges maintain absolute immunity from
actions for damages taken in their official capacity, even when
judges’ acts are done maliciously or corruptly.57 However, the
Court in Pulliam clarified this holding: while absolute judicial
immunity still bars a claim for monetary relief, it does not pre-
clude a claim for injunctive
relief, provided the claimant
continues to suffer real harm.58
Since then, at least one circuit
court has made available
prospective injunctive relief
against courts in other contexts
of discrimination.59 In fact,
seeking injunctive relief to
demand the use of a transgen-
der litigant’s preferred gender
pronouns is expressly endorsed
and encouraged by Lambda
Legal.60 As such, provided a
transgender litigant can show a continued harm that can only
be remedied by a prospective injunction, that litigant may be
able to successfully seek judicial relief.61
Finally, judicial ethics go beyond these legalistic arguments and
reach issues of fundamental morality and integrity. As the MCJC
Preamble points out, the MCJC “is not intended as an exhaustive
guide for the conduct of judges . . . who are governed in their
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62.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
63. Id. Scope.
64.Cf. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000)
(arguing that diverse judges are both role models and figures of
public confidence but should be seen as “something more”—as
achieving cultural plurality on the bench).
65.Name Change Recognition Motion, United States v. Manning, No.
ARMY 20130739 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015).
66.MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2011).
67.MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, AM. B. ASS’N, https://www.ameri
canbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last visited Dec.
11, 2017) (providing a list of CLE requirements by state, many of
which require one or more hours of legal ethics education).
68.EY (formerly Ernst & Young), LEADING THROUGH INCLUSION: LGBT
INCLUSION IN THE WORKFORCE (2012). A description of EY’s LGBT-
inclusion program is on its website at http://www.ey.com/
us/en/about-us/our-people-and-culture/diversity-and-inclusive-
ness/better-together (last visited February 5, 2018).
69.Allyhood Development Training, U. MICH. SPECTRUM CTR.,
https://spectrumcenter.umich.edu/article/allyhood-development-
training (last visited May 14, 2016); LGBT Ally Network, U. ILL.
OFF. INCLUSION & INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS, https://oiir.illi
nois.edu/lgbt-resource-center/our-programs/lgbt-ally-network
(last visited Dec. 11, 2017).
70.Diversity Training on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/diversity-train-
ing-on-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-issues (last visited
May 14, 2016).
71.LAMBDA LEGAL, GEAR UP! A FAIR COURTS TOOLKIT FOR EVERYDAY
ADVOCATES (2009),  http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/down
loads/gu_gear-up.zip.  The toolkit expressly includes guidance on
deferring to and affirming a transgender individual’s self-identity
and use of preferred gender pronouns. Id.
72.W.D. PA. LOCAL CIV. R. (LCvR) 16.1.
73. Id. app. LCvR 16.1A. 
judicial and personal conduct by
general ethical standards.
. . .”62 Moreover, “judges should
strive to exceed the standards of
conduct established by the
[MCJC],” especially since the “the
judiciary plays a central role in pre-
serving the principles of justice” in
the U.S. legal system.63 As dis-
cussed above, a judge maintains
the ethical responsibility to protect
the dignity and integrity of the
courts, which hinges on the con-
cept of respect. Thus, self-directing
judicial standards should maintain
a higher level of morality, even
beyond the confines of the law,
since judges are perceived as role
models to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.64
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Rather than forcing judges to address the issue of trans-
gender individuals’ preferred gender pronouns via formal
court motions as in Manning,65 judges should be more proac-
tive in combatting issues of transgender discrimination. Just
as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
direct lawyers to “keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice,”66 and just as many state bars mandate a certain
allotment of hours dedicated to continuing legal education,67
so, too, should judges remain updated with the changing legal
landscape and corresponding ethical considerations. Judges
can borrow successful efforts of various corporate organiza-
tions and educational institutions, both of which routinely
engage in LGBT “sensitivity” training for their bodies. For
example, prominent business advisory firm EY (formerly
Ernst & Young) encourages LGBT inclusion in a “cultural
competency” program, educating its employees and clients on
the benefits and necessity of fostering an inclusive environ-
ment.68 Additionally, various educational institutions offer
“Ally” training for their student and professional populations
in order to help “participants grow in their personal aware-
ness, knowledge, skills, and ability to act as social justice
allies.”69 Finally, LGBT advocacy groups across the country
offer public materials to organizations to help these organiza-
tions conduct their own inclusivity training for their mem-
bers.70 In fact, consistent with the position of this Note,
Lambda Legal offers a “Fair Courts Toolkit for Everyday
Advocates,” which provides guidance to judges and court
staffers as to how to best respect LGBT individuals in a court
environment.71 Education is key.
In addition, to avoid potential conflict at a later stage in lit-
igation, to avoid a potential violation of the MCJC, and to
avoid potential trauma to transgender individuals, judges
should encourage determinations of this preferred-gender-pro-
noun issue up front. Thus, courts should consider incorporat-
ing transgender sensitivity guidelines into their local rules. For
example, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania prescribes detailed requirements regarding what
is to be specifically discussed during pretrial conferences
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.72 Pursuant to these
local rules, parties must answer inquiries related to the under-
lying litigation, including issues of electronic discovery, use of
proposed search terms, anticipated dispositive motions to be
filed, proposals for alternative dispute resolution procedures,
and other inquiries and deadlines.73 Correspondingly, judges,
as managers of these conferences, should encourage full and
frank discussions of the potential ethical issues surrounding
transgender litigants from the outset of litigation, including, if
applicable, a specific inquiry regarding the use of a transgender
individual’s preferred gender pronouns. Doing so would avoid
potential trauma down the line for transgender litigants and
expedite litigation by anticipating and resolving likely court
motions before they have even been filed. Courts can ade-
quately incorporate this solution in their local rules by adding
the following point for discussion to their pretrial conference
agenda: “Identify and establish preferred names (including, if
applicable, preferred pronouns) for all parties subject to the lit-
igation.” The proposed directive would maintain consistency
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74.SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, TRANSGENDER 101:  TERMS AND CONSID-
ERATIONS FOR OFFICERS OF THE COURT (2011), https://www.ny
courts.gov/ip/judicialinstitute/transgender/220B.pdf.
75. Id. at 1.
76.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
77.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3.  Some state codifications
of the MCJC expressly include “gender identity” on the list of pro-
tected classes under Rule 2.3.  ABA POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM.,
COMPARISON OF ABA MODEL JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT AND STATE
VARIATIONS 3–4 (Dec. 11 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
2_3.authcheckdam.pdf.  These states include Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Mexico, and Oregon.  Id.
78.MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. 2.
79. Id.
across legal documents and would apply to all litigants—trans-
gender or not. More simply, courts can implement a “check-
the-box” system upon initial electronic filings that instructs
lawyers to specify a party’s pronoun and salutation preference
to guide judges and other court staffers from the outset of liti-
gation.
Even if not formally incorporated in a court’s local rules,
state or federal authorities can and should provide official
guidance to help judges and courts foster a more inclusive
environment. For example, the New York state judicial system
already maintains a quick-reference manual to help judges ade-
quately respond to transgender issues.74 Included in this doc-
ument is specific guidance addressing transgender pronoun
use: “Transgender people frequently choose to use a name that
affirms their gender identity, even if it is not what is on legal
documents. . . . Judges should make every effort to use pro-
nouns and salutations that affirm a party’s gender identity.”75
Other courts should follow suit. Since judges have an affirma-
tive duty to protect litigants from lawyers who exhibit bias and
prejudice against others on the basis of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation,76 these problems must be addressed as early as
possible. Judges should be mindful of this duty and take active
steps to avoid a breach of this duty.
Finally, the MCJC could be changed to include an express
provision and an associated comment to curtail this problem.
First, drafters could amend MCJC Rule 2.3 to expressly include
“gender identity” in its list of prohibited bases for bias and prej-
udice. Although implicit in discrimination on the basis of “sex”
and “gender,” an express provision regarding gender identity
would better guide judges in understanding the repercussions
of their actions in court proceedings by explicitly flagging the
issue.77 Also, the ABA could provide more detailed guidance in
its comments to Rule 2.3. Currently, Comment 2 provides
examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice: “epithets; slurs;
demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor
based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile
acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or
nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal
characteristics.”78 Even though the comment makes clear that
these manifestations “include, but are not limited to” those out-
lined in the non-exhaustive list, more explicit guidance can bet-
ter flag transgender issues and prevent bias from ever entering
into the courtroom in the first place.79 Thus, a proposed revi-
sion to Comment 2 could include “failing or refusing to adopt
a transgender person’s preferred pronoun” to help curtail this
risk of potential trauma. Doing so would put judges on better
notice of this problem within the judicial system.
CONCLUSION
Judges serve as pillars of the U.S. system of justice. Their
unique position of power carries with it the responsibility to
promote courtesy, impartiality, dignity, integrity, and respect.
The MCJC guides the ethical conduct of judges to protect their
status and preserve this notion of justice. In the case of Chelsea
Manning, the ACCA undoubtedly reached the correct decision
in forcing all parties to utilize Manning’s preferred gender pro-
nouns as per her identification as female. However, judges
should not be forced to reach the issue only when brought by
a party seeking protection; they should proactively seek to pro-
tect transgender individuals and their identities from the out-
set of litigation. Doing so is not only consistent with the
MCJC, but also with the current legal landscape of transgender
rights in the United States. To promulgate this change, judges
do not need to pen a landmark decision for the court. Instead,
it starts with education. It starts with respect. 
It starts with a pronoun.
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